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Abstract:  
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of monetary policy in a severe recession and 
deflation when nominal interest rates are bounded at zero. We compare two alternative 
proposals for ameliorating the effect of the zero bound: an exchange-rate peg and price-level 
targeting. We conduct this quantitative comparison in an empirical macroeconometric model 
of Japan, the United States and the euro area. Furthermore, we use a stylized micro-founded 
two-country model to check our qualitative findings. We find that both proposals succeed in 
generating inflationary expectations and work almost equally well under full credibility of 
monetary policy. However, price-level targeting may be less effective under imperfect 
credibility, because the announced price-level target path is not directly observable. 
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Researchers, practitioners and policymakers alike have made proposals for avoiding and if
necessary escaping deﬂation. In this paper, we focus on two proposals that have dominated
the debate most recently: an exchange-rate peg and price-level targeting. Svensson (2001,
2002, 2003), in particular, has emphasized that the central bank may create expectations
of inﬂation by devaluing and pegging the exchange rate for some time. Alternatively,
the central bank can try to manage expectations regarding future interest-rate policy by
announcing a target path for the price level and thus induce inﬂationary expectations.
The latter proposal goes back to Wolman (1998) but has been pushed most recently by
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
Our objective is to compare the eﬀectiveness of an exchange-rate peg and price-level
targeting in stimulating the Japanese economy in a severe recession and deﬂation scenario
when nominal interest rates are bounded at zero. We conduct a quantitative evaluation in
the estimated macroeconomic model with rational expectations and nominal rigidities of
Coenen and Wieland (2002) that covers the three largest economies, the United States, the
euro area and Japan. We recognize the zero-interest-rate bound explicitly in the analysis and
use numerical methods for solving nonlinear rational expectations models. Since this model
is not fully developed from microeconomic foundations we also cross-check our ﬁndings using
a stylized two-country model with imperfect competition that is derived from optimizing
behavior of households and ﬁrms given Calvo-type price contracts. This model is taken
from Benigno and Benigno (2001). The qualitative ﬁndings regarding the impact of the
zero bound and the two alternative proposals are quite similar in the two models. Not
surprisingly, the dynamics observed in the optimizing model are highly stylized and lack
the persistence observed in the data, but they provide some additional support for our
conclusions from a theoretical perspective.
Our quantitative ﬁndings in the estimated three-country model indicate an economically
signiﬁcant impact of the zero bound. Furthermore, we show that exchange-rate-based and
price-level-target-based proposals are equally eﬀective in inducing inﬂationary expectations
and stimulating the economy. This result depends on the assumptions of rational expec-
tations and full credibility of monetary policy. Price-level targeting may be less eﬀective
under imperfect credibility, because the announced price-level target path is not directly
observable. In particular, we show that if a signiﬁcant percentage of market participants
doubts that the central bank has truly adopted a price-level target, the central bank’s an-
nouncement is not anymore as eﬀective in mitigating the impact of the zero bound. The
exchange-rate peg at least oﬀers the advantage that the public can observe every period
whether the central bank maintains the exchange-rate peg.I. Introduction
Due to the recent experience in Japan the threat of deﬂation and a liquidity trap has taken
center stage in the debate on the proper formulation of monetary policy. Deﬂationary
episodes present a particular problem for monetary policy because the eﬀectiveness of its
main instrument, the short-term nominal interest rate, may be limited by the zero lower
bound.1 With interest rates near zero, the central bank will not be able to oﬀset recessionary
shocks by lowering nominal and thereby real interest rates. Furthermore, deﬂationary shocks
may raise real interest rates and worsen such a recession.
Researchers, practitioners and policymakers alike have made proposals for avoiding and
if necessary escaping deﬂation. In this note, we focus on two proposals that have dominated
the debate most recently: an exchange-rate peg and price-level targeting. Svensson (2001,
2003), in particular, has emphasized that the central bank may create expectations of inﬂa-
tion by devaluing and pegging the exchange rate for some time.2 Alternatively, the central
bank can try to manage expectations regarding future interest-rate policy by announcing a
target path for the price level and thus induce inﬂationary expectations. The latter proposal
has been pushed most recently by Eggertson and Woodford (2003).
Our objective is to compare the eﬀectiveness of an exchange-rate-peg and price-level
targeting in stimulating the Japanese economy in a severe recession and deﬂation scenario
when nominal interest rates are bounded at zero. We conduct a quantitative evaluation
in the estimated macroeconomic model of Coenen and Wieland (2002) that comprises the
United States, the euro area and Japan. We recognize the zero-interest-rate bound explic-
itly in the analysis and use numerical methods for solving nonlinear rational expectations
1Nominal interest rates on deposits cannot fall substantially below zero, as long as interest-free currency
constitutes an alternative store of value (McCallum, 2000).
2Related proposals for depreciating the exchange rate have been made by Orphanides and Wieland (2000)
and McCallum (2002) and have been compared with Svensson’s proposal by Coenen and Wieland (2003).
1models. Since this model is not fully developed from microeconomic foundations we check
whether similar results obtain in the stylized two-country model of Benigno and Benigno
(2001) that is derived under optimizing behavior of households and ﬁrms with imperfect
competition and Calvo-type price contracts.
II. Recession, Deﬂation and the Zero-Interest-Rate Bound
In the model of Coenen and Wieland (2002) monetary policy is neutral in the long-run,
because expectations in ﬁnancial markets, goods markets and labor markets are formed
in a rational, model-consistent manner. However, short-run real eﬀects arise due to the
presence of nominal rigidities in the form of staggered contracts. Model parameters are
estimated using quarterly data from 1974 to 1999 and the model ﬁts empirical inﬂation and
output dynamics in the United States, the euro area and Japan surprisingly well.
As a benchmark we assume that monetary policy follows Taylor’s rule. Thus, the nomi-
nal short-term interest rate, it, responds to deviations of the annual inﬂation rate, πt,f r o m
the target, π∗, and deviations of output from potential, qt, as follows:
it = r∗ + πt +0 .5(πt − π∗)+0 .5qt, (1)
where r∗ refers to the equilibrium real interest rate. Under normal circumstances, when the
short-term nominal interest rate is well above zero, the central bank may ease monetary
policy by expanding the supply of the monetary base and bringing down the short-term rate
of interest. Since prices of goods and services adjust more slowly than those on ﬁnancial
instruments, such a money injection reduces real interest rates and provides a stimulus to
the economy. Whenever monetary policy is expressed in form of an interest rate rule, it
is implicitly assumed that the central bank injects liquidity so as to achieve the rate that
is prescribed by the interest rate rule. However, at the zero bound further injections of
2liquidity have no additional eﬀect on the nominal interest rate, and a negative interest rate
prescribed by the interest rate rule cannot be implemented.
To illustrate the potentially dramatic consequences of the zero-interest-rate bound and
deﬂation we simulate an extended period of recessionary and deﬂationary shocks in the
Japan block of our three-country model. Initial conditions are set to steady state with an
inﬂation target of 1%, a real equilibrium rate of 1.5%, and thus an equilibrium nominal
interest rate of 2.5%. Then, the economy is hit by a sequence of negative demand and
contract price shocks for a total period of 5 years. The magnitude of the demand and
contract price shocks is set equal to -1.5 and -1 percentage points respectively.
The output and inﬂation performance of the Japanese economy if monetary policy were
to stick to Taylor’s rule is shown by the solid lines in Figure 1. The left panel reports
the output gap while the right panel displays the annual rate of inﬂation. As a result of
the sequence of shocks the Japanese economy plunges into a double-digit recession (with
an output gap of up to -14%) while experiencing a massive decline in the price level (with
a rate of inﬂation close to -11%).
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Figure 1. Output Gap and Inflation in a Severe Recession and Deflation
3To a large extent the depth of this recession is due to the reduced eﬀectiveness of
monetary policy in a liquidity trap. As shown by the solid line in the left panel of Figure 2
nominal interest rates are constrained at zero for almost a decade. Thus, deﬂation leads to
an increase in the long-term real interest rate up to 3% and the Yen temporarily appreciates
in real terms. Consequently, the recession and deﬂation are much more pronounced than
they would be in the absence of the zero bound.
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Figure 2. Interest Rate and Exchange Rate in a Severe Recession and
Deflation
A counterfactual simulation (not shown in this ﬁgure), in which the zero bound is not
imposed, indicates that the central bank would like to respond to the onset of recession
and disinﬂation by drastically lowering nominal interest rates. If this were possible the
long-term real interest rate would decline by about 4% and the central bank would be able
to contain the output gap and deﬂation around -9% and -7% respectively. The reduction in
nominal interest rates would be accompanied by an 11% real depreciation in trade-weighted
terms.
4III. Exchange-Rate Peg versus Price-Level Targeting
Svensson (2001) oﬀers what he calls a foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap. With
interest rates constrained at zero and ongoing deﬂation he recommends that the central bank
stimulates the economy and raises inﬂationary expectations by switching to an exchange-
rate peg at a substantially devalued exchange rate. The exchange-rate peg is intended to
be temporary and should be abandoned in favor of price-level or inﬂation targeting once
the price-level reaches a pre-announced target path. His concrete proposal is as follows:
• Announce a devaluation and subsequent peg of the nominal exchange rate at a given
target,
st =¯ s, t ≥ t0 (2)
• announce that the peg will be abandoned once the price level again coincides with an
upward-sloping target path,
p∗
t = p∗
t0 +0 .25π∗ (t − t0),t ≥ t0 (3)
with p∗
t0 >p t0 and π∗ > 0. From then on, a policy of price-level or inﬂation targeting
may be followed. 3
Svensson emphasizes that the central bank should be able to enforce the peg at a de-
valued rate by standing ready to buy up foreign currency at this rate to an unlimited
extent if necessary. This situation diﬀers from the defense of an overvalued exchange rate,
which requires selling foreign currency and poses the risk of running out of foreign exchange
reserves.
3If the target inﬂation that is implicit in the price-level target path diﬀers from the foreign target inﬂation
rate then a crawling exchange-rate peg may be more appropriate than a ﬁxed peg.
5We investigate the consequences of Svensson’s proposal if it is adopted after the central
bank has observed 9 quarters of zero nominal interest rates. The outcome is shown by the
dashed lines in Figure 1 and Figure 2. In our simulation the peg is implemented with
respect to the U.S. Dollar and st denotes the bilateral nominal Yen/U.S. Dollar exchange
rate. Important choice variables in Svensson’s proposal are the initial price level of the
implied target path, the extent of the devaluation and the length of the peg.
The exchange-rate peg delivers the intended results. As shown in Figure 1 (dashed
line) inﬂationary expectations are jump-started and rise very quickly. As a result, the real
interest rate declines very rapidly, the real exchange rate depreciates, and the economy
recovers more quickly from the recession. The implied nominal devaluation is shown in the
right panel of Figure 2 (dashed line). It induces a 15% real depreciation in the trade-
weighted exchange rate.
Uncovered interest parity and exchange-rate expectations play a key role. Once the
central bank announces thevpeg the expected exchange-rate change is zero and the nominal
interest rate rises to the level of the foreign rate absent any risk premium. The left panel
of Figure 2 (dashed line) conﬁrms that the nominal interest rate jumps to a positive level
immediately upon the start of the peg.
The preceding analysis of Svensson’s proposed exchange-rate peg emphasizes that es-
caping from the liquidity trap requires generating expectations of inﬂation. However, the
exchange-rate peg is not a necessary ingredient. Inﬂationary expectations may simply be
achieved by promising future policy easing. Using a small micro-founded closed-economy
model Eggertson and Woodford (2003) show that it is optimal for the central bank to com-
mit to keeping nominal interest rates lower in the future in order to aﬀect expectations
of inﬂation while the zero bound is still binding. They also show that the optimal policy
6can be implemented through commitment to a history-dependent rule using a price-level
target that evolves over time. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that a simpler rule with a ﬁxed target
achieves most of the beneﬁts of the optimal policy. Inspired by their ﬁndings we investigate
whether switching to a price-level target alone would be suﬃcient to stimulate inﬂationary
expectations in our estimated model. More precisely, we consider the performance of the
following policy proposal:
• Announce an upward-sloping price-level target path as deﬁned by equation (3) and
replace the inﬂation target in Taylor’s rule (equation (1)) with this price-level tar-
get, thereby committing to lower interest rates in the future until the price gap is
completely closed.
Figure 3 compares the performance of the Japanese economy in our model when the
central bank switches to the price-level target (dashed-dotted line) after 9 quarters of zero
interest rates with the performance under a switch to an exchange-rate peg (dashed line).
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
−16.0
 −8.0
  0.0
  8.0
Output Gap
Quarter
exchange−rate target
price−level target
price−level target under
imperfect credibility
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
−12.0
 −6.0
  0.0
  6.0
 12.0
Annual Inflation
Quarter
Figure 3. Exchange-Rate Peg versus Price-Level Targeting
7Surprisingly, switching to the price-level target alone is just as eﬀective in generating
inﬂationary expectations as the exchange-rate peg. Output and inﬂation return even a bit
more quickly to steady-state. The reason being that the nominal interest rate remains at
zero much longer and consequently the long-term real rate falls lower and the real depreci-
ation is a bit larger than under the exchange-rate peg.
IV. Implications of Imperfect Credibility
So far, exchange-rate-based and price-level-target-based approaches appear equally eﬀective
in inducing inﬂationary expectations in a liquidity trap. From a practical perspective,
however, there is an important diﬀerence. While the exchange-rate peg can be veriﬁed
every day it is maintained by the central bank, the price-level target path and resulting
price gap are not directly observable. Thus, the success of price-level targeting may depend
very much on the credibility of the announced target path.
To gauge the validity of our ﬁndings we consider an alternative scenario, in which a
share λ of market participants trust the central bank’s commitment to the price-level target
(0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) while the others remain sceptical regarding the policy switch (1−λ). Sceptical
market participants still believe that the central bank will pursue an inﬂation target rather
than a price-level target. In other words, they do not believe that the central bank intends
to induce suﬃcient inﬂation in the future to fully make up the price-level gap. We assume
that the share λ converges to one at an exponential rate and report output and inﬂation
outcomes for an initial value of 0.2i nFigure 3 (dotted lines). We ﬁnd that the beneﬁts
of a switch to price-level targeting are reduced substantially if a large share of market
participants does not immediately buy the central bank’s announcement.
8V. Conclusions
The strength of the estimated three-country model lies in its ability to match the observed
degree of persistence of output and inﬂation in Japan, the United States and the euro
area. However, the model diﬀers from a standard New-Keynesian micro-founded model in
several ways, most importantly because lags of the output gap are included in the behavioral
demand equations. To investigate the validity of our results from a theoretical perspective
we have simulated a similar recession and deﬂation scenario in the micro-founded two-
country model of Benigno and Benigno (2001).4 We have obtained qualitatively similar
results as far as the eﬀect of the zero bound on output, inﬂation and interest rates is
concerned. However, not surprisingly, the eﬀect of the zero bound is rather small and the
dynamics are highly stylized due to the lack of intrinsic persistence in the micro-founded
model.
Based on our quantitative ﬁndings in the estimated model we conclude that the zero
bound on nominal interest rates has an econonomically signiﬁcant impact on the macroe-
conomic performance of the Japanese economy in a recession and deﬂation scenario. We
also ﬁnd that the central bank may improve performance substantially by devaluing the
exchange rate and switching to an exchange-rate peg or by committing to a price-level
target path and an interest-rate rule that will close the price gap in the future. From a
practical perspective, however, the lack of immediate veriﬁability may render a price-level-
targeting-based proposal for escaping from a liquidity trap less credible and consequently
less eﬀective.
4For a more detailed presentation of these results see the working paper version of this paper, Coenen
and Wieland (2004).
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